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Introduction
Russia is a power unlike others in Central Asia, given its role 
as  the  region’s  former  coloniser,  which  started  in  the  19th 
century and even in the 18th for some of the northern parts of 
Kazakhstan. This legacy has its positive and negative aspects: 
it has been positive insofar as it has involved a long period 
of Russo–Central Asian cohabitation that has given rise to a 
common feeling of belonging to the same ‘civilisation’; it has been 
negative insofar as it has accrued all the political resentment and 
cultural misinterpretations of the coloniser–colonised relationship. 
Russian–Central  Asian  relations  are  therefore  complex,  with 
each of the actors having a highly emotional perception of its 
relation to the other. 
While  some  observers  have  hoped  that  the  economic  crisis 
affecting  Russia  would  work  to  weaken  it  geopolitically,  it 
must be noted that the crisis, paradoxically, is actually helping 
Moscow to reinforce its control over its neighbouring countries, 
at least for time being. The Kremlin seems to have made up 
its mind to invest significant sums of money to consolidate its 
sphere of influence in the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), a stake it sees as crucial and therefore as independent of 
economic contingencies. Albeit less triumphant, today’s Russia 
is no longer that of the beginning of the 1990s – even with 
revenues in decline, foreign policy objectives and strategies for 
domestic control are well defined and will be maintained. Despite 
the vertiginous fall of the national currencies in relation to the 
dollar, Russia has proposed to set up a stabilisation fund of $10 
billion, of which it will finance three-quarters. Kyrgyzstan hopes 
to get a promised $2 billion to lift itself out of its current economic 
impasse: emergency aid of $150 million, a credit of $300 million 
at  reduced  interest  rates,  more  than  $1.5  billion  earmarked 
for the Kambarata hydroelectric station and the conversion of 
Kyrgyz public debt to Russia into a capital holding in Dastan, 
one of the Kyrgyz military-industrial complex’s only enterprises. 
Russia thus continues to be a major player in the Central Asian 
game, regardless of the latter’s growing strategic and economic 
uncertainty.
After analysing the historical evolution of the Russian presence 
in Central Asia, this paper moves on to focus on Moscow’s two 
main concerns in the region, namely the economy, especially 
gas and oil exports from Central Asia, and security issues.1 For 
the Kremlin, the region’s growing strategic insecurity and the 
risks of destabilisation constitute the first motif of involvement. 
More specifically, Russia wants to avoid a situation whereby it will 
have no other choice but to intervene militarily; it wants to secure 
its own territory and regime, which is much weaker and more 
divided than Western observers conventionally think. Finally, this 
paper looks at the prospects for collaboration between the EU 
and Russia in this region: How can the currently competitive 
mindset be turned into the atmosphere of cooperation that the 
Central Asian states actively call for? As the EU does not seek to 
become a monopolistic actor in Central Asia, it is in its interest 
to develop areas of cooperation with Russia in the region. If the 
stakes are formulated in terms of exclusive choices, the EU, 
which is too distant a power, will not win Central Asian hearts; 
but it can increase its potential to attract Central Asia by showing 
its capacity for developing collective action with Russia.
The  changing  Russian  presence  in  Central 
Asia 
After the implosion of the Soviet Union, Russia’s standing as 
a  former  colonial  centre  presented  it  with  many  difficulties, 
as in Central Asia, holding Moscow at bay was a top priority. 
Resounding critiques rang out about ‘Russian colonialism’, but 
these only lasted for a brief period. During the mid-1990s, the 
newly independent states began attenuating their criticisms of 
Moscow as they started experiencing social difficulties, a time 
when nostalgia for the Brezhnev years became an increasingly 
popular leitmotiv and Russians could no longer be blamed for 
all the evils.2 Less than two decades has therefore sufficed for 
this common legacy to be more positively reshaped, that is, for 
Moscow to succeed in inverting the Soviet past and turning it into 
an asset of shared proximity. Since 2000, Russia has once again 
become a respected power in Central Asia, where its economic 
and geopolitical revival is widely admired. 
Russian interests in Central Asia have significantly altered since 
the end of the cold war.3 The past two decades can be divided 
into three phases: in the first, which stretches from the fall of the 
Soviet Union to the first half of the 1990s, the Kremlin had no 
clear Central Asia policy or even one to deal with the rest of the 
former Soviet space. The CIS was construed as a mechanism to 
procure a ‘civilised divorce’, not as a means to maintain Russian 
leadership over the rest of its former empire. The reasons for 
Russia’s sudden disinterest in Central Asia were multiple and of 
a nature that were at once ideological, political and economic. 
On the cultural level, Moscow was also rather absent, choosing 
not to defend its sizeable Russian minority in Central Asia, which, 
in 1989, included nearly 10 million persons. Neither did it invest 
much in the Russophone structures (schools, universities, the 
media, etc.) so crucial to preserving its cultural influence.4 Only 
on 14 September 1995 did Russia finally decree that the CIS was 
a space of vital interest, meaning that Moscow wanted to reserve 
a right of inspection over the external borders of the former 
Soviet Union. In the second half of the 1990s, rapid changes in 
Russia’s domestic situation led to the birth of a second phase 
of Russian foreign policy. According to the ‘Primakov doctrine’, 
part of Russia’s attempt to regain its international status involved 
recovering  its  role  as  a  centre  of  influence  over  post-Soviet 
space.  The  formulation  of  this  strategy,  however,  remained 
ambiguous, since official discourse continued to appeal for the 
creation of a Euro–Atlantic alliance that included Russia.5
The third phase of Russian foreign policy is linked to Vladimir 
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Putin’s coming to power. As soon as he took up office, Russia’s 
new strongman went to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, followed in 
May 2000 by another visit to Uzbekistan and one to Turkmenistan. 
On 28 June 2000, Putin formulated a new foreign policy for the 
Federation,  which  recognised  its  limited  capacities  and  the 
need to make a certain number of geopolitical concessions. It 
gave priority to Russian investments in the CIS states6 and to 
developing  active  diplomatic  relations  with  strategic  partners 
such  as  India,  Iran  and  China.  Putin’s  Russia  called  for  the 
CIS Collective Security Treaty to be strengthened in order to 
deal with Islamist threats in the Caucasus and Central Asia and 
it declared its desire to regain control of the region’s energy 
resources,  particularly  those  in  the  Caspian  Sea.7  Relations 
with  the  two  Central  Asian  states  most  resistant  to  Russian 
influence, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, slowly improved, and 
Putin’s visit to the capitals of both countries in 2000 was hailed 
as a diplomatic success. The other three states (Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan), whose policies were more balanced 
between the West and Russia, positively welcomed the signs of 
revival emanating from the Kremlin.8 The events of 11 September 
2001 then had the effect of sharply reinforcing Moscow’s desire 
to step up its involvement in Central Asia.9 
During  Vladimir  Putin’s  two  mandates  (2000–08),  Russia 
succeeded in returning to its status as the number one partner 
of the Central Asian states. On the multilateral level, the two 
Moscow-initiated  organisations,  the  Eurasian  Economic 
Community, created in 2000 on a Kazakhstani proposition, and 
the Collective Security Treaty, founded in 2002, today function 
as the major institutional frameworks of Russo–Central Asian 
cooperation. On the bilateral level, Moscow is again a first-order 
strategic and military ally. The Kremlin has made a show of 
its  abiding  political  support  for  the  Central  Asian  regimes,  a 
rapprochement facilitated by the common struggle against the 
so-called ‘Islamist threat’. In exchange for the Kremlin’s backing 
of their fight against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb 
ut-Tahrir,10 and against political opposition more generally, the 
states of Central Asia have agreed to support Russia in its war 
in Chechnya. The ‘coloured revolutions’ in Georgia in 2003, in 
Ukraine in 2004 and in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 further strengthened 
this  political  rapprochement,  compelling  all  the  Central  Asian 
presidents to fall into line behind Putin. All of them reiterated 
his accusations of unacceptable Western interference, argued 
for the need to have strong regimes to avoid destabilisation by 
Islamists and adopted stricter legislation concerning NGOs and 
‘civil society’. This alliance reached its apogee during the Andijan 
insurrection of 13 May 2005, which was repressed by the Uzbek 
authorities.11 
If,  since  the  1990s,  Russia  has  been  overwhelmed  in  the 
economic sector to such an extent that it will not be able to 
reconquer the markets it lost, on the political and geopolitical 
levels, things are quite different. Russia has held good on its 
promises by positively responding to the requests of Central 
Asian leaders. Although it was criticised by Tashkent for barely 
reacting to the incursions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
into  Kyrgyzstan  and  Tajikistan  in  the  summers  of  1999  and 
2000, Russia’s awareness of the Islamist danger in the region 
has enabled it to find a common language with the Central 
Asian states. Moscow has also deftly taken advantage of the 
deteriorating  relations  between  Central  Asia  and  Washington 
and has put in place strategies for the ‘containment’ of Western 
influence in the region. Indeed, what distinguishes Russia from 
Western countries is that it does not link its assistance to political 
conditions, and the Central Asian regimes, which have become 
more and more authoritarian, have been particularly appreciative 
of this. Russia has thus played a crucial role in Central Asian 
state building by promoting a post-Soviet mode of governance 
that could be defined as authoritarian. 
Since 2000, its influence on Central Asian policy-making has 
become more direct, notably after its statement that it considered 
the Western model of parliamentary democracy to be inapplicable 
in the region. This political rapprochement has had a significant 
political impact on Central Asian societies: political reforms for 
democratisation  have  been  impeded;  the  activities  of  NGOs 
and civil society have been increasingly curtailed; and gaining 
access to new technologies and to media like the Internet has 
become more difficult.12 Even Kyrgyzstan, generally considered 
the  most  democratic  country  in  Central  Asia,  has  attempted 
since 2007 to establish a ‘vertical power’ structure, which, while 
detrimental to democratic initiatives, is aimed at stabilising the 
country, fostering investments and reasserting state authority. 
In Kazakhstan, the power transfer between Vladimir Putin and 
Dmitri Medvedev was very closely followed by Astana, given that 
it is seeking to find a way to preserve the interests of the ruling 
elites if Nursultan Nazarbaev leaves office in 2012. Russia has 
once more become the primary political model for Central Asian 
regimes, which are attracted neither to Western parliamentary 
systems nor to Chinese monopartyism. 
Russia’s main economic involvement: Control 
over hydrocarbons
In the economic domain, Russia has also regained a dominant 
position.13  Russian–Central  Asian  trade  bounced  back  at  the 
start of the 2000s and tripled between 2003 and 2007, shooting 
up from $7 billion to $21 billion, a third of which comes from the 
hydrocarbon sector.14 In 2006, Russia again became Kazakhstan’s 
main import partner (trade figures rose to over $10 billion) and its 
third largest export partner after the EU and China. It is now once 
again Uzbekistan’s premier commercial partner, accounting for 
more than a quarter of its total foreign exchange (more than $3 
billion in 2007). In addition, Moscow has become Kyrgyzstan’s 
second largest trade partner after China, but remains Tajikistan’s 
largest partner with China coming second. In Turkmenistan, to 
date Russia has trailed behind Ukraine, Iran and some European 
countries; however, Gazprom’s growing role is likely to change 
this in 2009. Like the EU, Russia’s trade with Central Asia is 
clearly dominated by energy questions.
Russia’s  presence  in  the  Central  Asian  energy  sector  has 
steadily grown since the 1990s. Its activities were initially limited 
to Kazakhstan, but around 2000 Gazprom also began to make 
significant inroads into Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, and since 
2005, into Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as well. Reflecting Russia’s 
energy  interests,  there  has  been  an  increase  in  the  relative 
proportion of gas and oil exchanges in Russo–Central Asian 
trade, which went from 23% of total trade in 2003 to 36% in 
2006 or from $2 billion to $4.6 billion.15 This increase principally 
stems  from  growth  in  the  gas  sector  trade  with  Uzbekistan, 
since the gas trade with Turkmenistan has remained more or 
less stable and oil exchanges with Kazakhstan have grown only 
modestly. Russia’s share in Kazakhstan’s and Uzbekistan’s oil 
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the hydrocarbon sector is still below its Soviet-era levels: Central 
Asian imports of Russian oil and intra-Central Asian trade remain 
largely inferior to 1990 levels; only in the area of Central Asian 
gas exports to Russia do trade figures look likely to exceed 
Soviet levels by 2010. 
These energy flows are on the whole unidirectional, going from 
Central  Asia  to  Russia.  Russia  itself  only  consumes  a  small 
quantity  of  Central  Asian  hydrocarbons  and  then  re-exports 
them to Ukraine and Western Europe. In comparison with other 
international actors, Moscow’s investment in the hydrocarbon 
sector in Central Asia in 2006 was a modest $4-5 billion, 80% of 
which was invested in Kazakhstan and 10% in Uzbekistan. Yet 
Russian companies are now looking to augment their financial 
involvement  in  the  region,  and  are  planning  to  invest  about 
$15 billion by 2012, principally in developing the infrastructure 
for transport and deposits. Moscow’s aim in Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan is to gain a firm hold over the sale of highly profitable oil 
products, while Gazprom is undertaking the exploration of Tajik 
gas deposits in Sargazon (in the Khatlon region) and in Rengan 
(close to Dushanbe), as well as of Kyrgyz gas deposits in the 
country’s south. Gazprom is also hoping to acquire a share of 
the state-run companies Kyrgyzgaz and Kyrgyzneftegaz as they 
enter the privatisation phase.
Russia is involved in numerous energy projects in Kazakhstan. 
It  is  undertaking  the  geological  study  and  development  of 
gas  deposits  in  Karachaganak  (in  western  Kazakhstan)  and 
Imashevskoe (Atyrau region), of oil deposits in North Buzachi and 
in Karakuduk (Mangystau region), of both gas and oil deposits in 
North Kumkol (Kzyl-Orda region) and in Alibekmola and Kozhasay 
(Aktobe region), and of offshore sites in the Kazakh part of 
the Caspian Sea. Russian companies are also involved in the 
construction of a gas refinery in Orenburg and a gas chemical 
complex close to Khvalinskoe. Rosneft is part of a project to 
upgrade the capacity of the Atyrau–Samara pipeline, which is 
set to increase from 15 to 25 million tonnes annually. Lastly, 
the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, 24% of which is controlled by 
the Russian state and 20% by Russian companies, is planning 
to increase the capacity of the Tengiz–Novorossiisk site from 
32 to 67 million tonnes annually. Other collaborative projects on 
the  Centre–Central  Asia  and  the  Bukhara–Ural  gas  pipelines 
are also underway to develop the capacity to transit Uzbek and 
Turkmen gas.16 
In Turkmenistan, only the gas sector interests Russia. ITERA is 
the only Russian company directly involved in the exploitation of 
hydrocarbons, although Lukoil and a TNK–BP joint venture are 
presently trying to enter the Turkmen market. Russia’s presence 
remains  rather  limited,  as  Ashgabat  only  permits  foreign 
companies to invest in offshore deposits, which are the most 
costly and challenging on a technical level. Because the status 
of the Caspian Sea remains unresolved, such deposits are also 
the most complex geopolitically since they are often close to the 
Iranian border. Russo–Turkmen cooperation is therefore limited 
in the main to exporting Turkmen gas to Russia via the Centre–
Central Asia gas pipeline, which Gazprom plans to pour more 
than $2 billion into renovating. In Uzbekistan, Russian companies 
are involved in developing gas deposits in Shakhpakhty and 
Kungrad (in Karakalpakstan), in Kandym, Khauzak and Shady 
(in the Bukhara region), along with gas and petrol deposits in 
Zhambay (in the Uzbek part of the Aral Sea), some situated 
in the Gissar region (near Karshi) and in Urga, Kuanysh and 
Akhchalak (on the Ustyurt Plateau). Moscow has also invested 
in transit infrastructure, such as the Centre–Central Asia and 
Bukhara–Ural gas pipelines, which Uztransgaz and Gazprom are 
planning to modernise and develop. 
More so than other international actors, Moscow plays a structuring 
role in the development of the Central Asian hydrocarbon market. 
Always on the lookout for possibilities to export resources and 
collect transit rights, Russia is contributing to the increases in 
export levels of Central Asian resources out of the region (85% of 
Kazakh oil products are exported out of the CIS, while the figure 
for Turkmenistan is 78%). Russia is also helping to reduce internal 
trade among the five states: Uzbekistan exports five times less 
gas to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan than it did in 1990, 
and imports very small quantities of oil from Kazakhstan, while 
Turkmenistan no longer plays any part in the regional energy 
game at all.17 With domestic consumption rising, however, the 
increasing  emphasis  on  exporting  energy  is  aggravating  the 
recurrent energy crises in the two weakest states, Kyrgyzstan 
and  Tajikistan,  while  South  Kazakhstan  and  Uzbekistan  also 
experience regular but less severe energy shortfalls. 
Russia is reinforcing Central Asia in its role as an exporter of 
primary  resources  by  neglecting  to  develop  its  hydrocarbon 
refining capacity, especially the manufacture of products with 
high added value. This is ultimately an inefficient, and even 
dangerous, trade pattern from the point of view of Central Asia’s 
long-term economic interests. But it seems likely that Moscow 
will lose its control over this regional market. Not only have new 
actors  emerged,  especially  China,  but  also  the  development 
of shipping in the Caspian Sea and rail transport has reduced 
the importance of land pipelines. Moreover, because Russo–
Central  Asian  energy  exchanges  are  mainly  run  by  state-
owned  companies  involved  in  government-directed  activities, 
cooperation entails a certain political will, which sometimes runs 
counter to the commercial interests of each state. 
In the energy domain, Moscow realises that it can no longer 
control Central Asian gas and oil prices, which are in the process 
of rising to world prices thanks to the energy needs of Iran, 
the West and above all China – all of whom are ready to pay 
high prices to strip Gazprom, Lukoil and Rosneft of their quasi-
monopoly. The export routes are now no longer exclusively in 
Russia’s hands either: Turkmen gas is already exported directly 
to Iran and soon will be to China, while Kazakh oil is exported to 
China and the West via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceylan pipeline. Trying 
to capture markets, large Russian companies have implemented 
aggressive trade offensives, which, similar to the situation of 
other great world powers, are also instruments of official political 
interests. Although in the 1990s the major Russian companies 
pursued  their  own  policies,  often  in  contradiction  with  those 
decided by the Kremlin, under Putin state interests and those 
of the major companies have reunified. This seems to have 
provided Russia with a single solution for its multiple objectives: 
first,  to  maintain  political  influence  over  the  Central  Asian 
regimes through the control of resources; second, to continue 
collecting considerable transit revenues from these landlocked 
countries; third, to slow down – but not stop – the emergence 
of competing export routes to China, Iran and Turkey; and finally, 
to meet growing European energy demands. 
Despite the predominance of the energy issue, Russia’s trade 
with Central Asia also extends to other important sectors of 
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uranium (the reinforcement of nuclear integration between  •	
Moscow and Astana, and the creation of joint ventures for 
extraction and the building of reactors); 
electricity (the maintenance of the Soviet grid facilitates  •	
common projects); 
hydroelectricity (Russia finances Sangtuda in Tajikistan  •	
and Kambarata in Kyrgyzstan); 
construction (mainly in Kazakhstan);  •	
telecommunications (above all mobile telephony);  •	
transport (particularly the freight services);  •	
railways (but not the automobile market);  •	
banks  (the  Russo–Kazakhstani  partnerships  are  •	
multiplying); 
the military-industrial complex; and lastly  •	
certain agribusiness sectors (Russia and Kazakhstan are  •	
strengthening their cooperation on cereals). 
The  simplification  of  customs  procedures  with  Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan, thanks to the Eurasian Economic 
Community, also enables Russian food products to enter the 
Central Asian market. Meanwhile, in the opposite direction, the 
Central Asian space is ever more utilised as a transit zone for 
Chinese commodities bound for central Siberia and the Altay. 
In all likelihood, however, Russia will be overtaken by China as 
the main trade partner of the Central Asian states, if that is not 
already the case in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.18
So  Russia  remains  a  dominant  economic  actor  in  Central 
Asia, if energy is taken into account. It is an important actor 
in  heavy  industry  and  infrastructure,  both  of  which  are  old 
Soviet specialisations. But it is a relatively modest and rather 
uncompetitive  actor  in  terms  of  small  and  medium-sized 
enterprises, new technologies, etc. This stratification offers a 
more general reflection of the Russian economy as a whole, 
which is still in a logic of rent and is having problems diversifying 
itself. At the same time, it is also explained by the state of the 
Central Asian economies, in which small and medium-sized firms 
and new technologies struggle to find a place. These economies, 
it seems, are destined to serve above all as transit zones for 
Russo–Chinese trade, hence the emphasis on infrastructure and 
all the freight-related services. 
The  security  issue:  Are  the  dangers  coming 
from the south?
The second key domain of Russian presence in Central Asia 
is that of regional security. Since the early 1990s, this domain 
has been the primary driving force behind Moscow’s continued 
presence in the region; yet from 2000 onwards, the mechanisms 
of  this  collaboration  have  profoundly  transformed.  The  key 
security challenges for Russia in Central Asia are multiple and 
complex: any destabilisation in the weakest (Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan) or the most dangerous (Uzbekistan) states will have 
immediate repercussions in Russia, including effects such as
Islamist infiltration in the Volga-Ural region and the north  •	
Caucasus, indeed in the whole of the country; 
an increase in the inflow of drugs reaching the Russian  •	
population,  which  is  already  widely  targeted  by  drug 
traffickers; 
a loss of control over the export networks of hydrocarbons,  •	
as well as over uranium sites, strategic sites in the military-
industrial complex and electricity power stations; 
a drop in trade exchanges;  •	
a loss of direct access to Afghanistan; and •	
an uncontrollable surge in flows of migrants, especially  •	
of refugees. 
For Moscow, the security of the southern borders of Central Asia is 
seen as a question of domestic security, not out of ‘imperialism’, 
but of pragmatism: the 7,000 km stretch of Russo–Kazakhstani 
border,  in  the  heart  of  the  steppes,  is  nearly  impossible  to 
securitise. The situation requires that the clandestine flows are 
better controlled downstream, as it were, which confirms Central 
Asia’s role as a buffer zone for Russia. 
Of the CIS institutions, only the Anti-Terrorist Centre is properly 
functional, inasmuch as it continues to provide the Central Asian 
security services with training and offers joint exercises called 
“South Anti-Terror”, administered by the Russian FSB. Russo–
Central  Asian  multilateral  collaborations  are  actually  geared 
towards the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), which 
includes Russia, the Central Asian states (except Turkmenistan), 
Byelorussia and Armenia.19 Apart from its role in the elaboration 
of collective strategies of struggle against terrorism, transnational 
dangers  and  drug  trafficking,  the  CSTO  is  the  only  regional 
institution  with  a  genuine  military  dimension.20  The  Collective 
Rapid Deployment Force for Central Asia, comprised of Kazakh, 
Kyrgyz, Russian and Tajik units, totalling around 4,000 men, is 
the only one with trained armed forces capable of intervening 
in real time and will probably be upgraded to 15,000 soldiers. 
Common military exercises, carried out annually in one of the 
member countries, simulate terrorist attacks (‘Rubezh’) or anti-
narcotics operations (‘Kanal’). Since 2005, the CSTO has also 
revived  cooperation  between  the  Russian  and  Central  Asian 
military-industrial complexes. The Intergovernmental Committee 
for Military and Economic Cooperation allows for the preferential 
sale  of  Russian  military  material  to  Central  Asian  states  at 
domestic Russian market prices and for the closer integration of 
national military industries. 
Nevertheless, bilateralism dominates in the domain of security. 
From the early 1990s, Russia has held joint military exercises with 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, in particular at Ashuluk 
in  the  Astrakhan  region;  however,  exercises  with  Uzbekistan 
only began in 2005 and none have been organised with the 
Turkmen army. From the outset, Russia was clear about what it 
saw as the main concern of bilateral cooperation: the protection 
of the international borders of the former USSR. Although there 
are no longer any Russian troops in Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan 
or Tajikistan, bilateral consultations are still conducted on the 
securitisation of borders and operations are organised that focus 
on drug trafficking and illegal migration, such as those that have 
been undertaken with Kazakhstan on the Caspian Sea and along 
the length of the Chinese border. The FSB border service plays 
an advisory role and provides technical assistance in Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan. Russian troops, who helped both countries create 
their own air defence systems in the 1990s, continue to train their 
air force personnel. The second largest domain of cooperation, 
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personnel training. The Soviet legacy and Russian dynamism 
in this sector have enabled Moscow to help train a majority 
of Central Asian military personnel, including more than 2,500 
from Kazakhstan, more than 800 from Kyrgyzstan, more than 
500 from Tajikistan and more than 250 from Uzbekistan. Several 
hundred high-level Central Asians have gained their diplomas 
at Russian military academies, which also serve as models for 
the Central Asian military schools, and the two Russian military 
bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan additionally offer specialised 
on-site training. 
The Russian authorities have succeeded in keeping or in regaining 
a  number  of  military  and  research  facilities  in  Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The most important ones from the 
entire  former  Soviet  Union  are  those  in  Kazakhstan,  which 
therefore constitute a major element of the Russian defence 
system. Since the 1990s, Astana has given Russia the use of 
several firing ranges in exchange for military material, specialised 
maintenance and officer training. Moscow, for instance, rents the 
famous Baikonur spatial complex from Astana (70% of Russian 
rocket launches occur there), as well as weapons and missile 
launch centres in the regions of Atyrau and western Kazakhstan. 
Russia also rents ballistic missile test firing ranges in the regions 
of Karaganda, Zhambul, Aktobe and Kzyl-Orda, and the Gulchad 
site  in  the  region  of  Lake  Balkhash,  which  monitors  ballistic 
missiles and spatial objects circulating above Asia as far as 
3,000 km away. 
In Kyrgyzstan, Russia has the Kant base at its disposal, which 
opened in 2003 and can accommodate close to 800 men, and 
has recently announced plans to open a second one in the south 
of the country. The Kant base controls several sites, such as the 
seismic control station of the Russian defence ministry in the 
Tian Shan mountain range, the Kara-Balta station at Chaldovar 
in the Chui region (which depends on the Russian military fleet) 
and the anti-submarine weapons test zone of the Russian army 
in Karakol on the shores of Lake Issyk Kul. Since the signing 
of a 2004 treaty with Tajikistan, Moscow has opened its largest 
military base outside the Federation’s borders, where it stations 
the 201st armed division. Russia has been allowed to deploy 
other troop units at Kurgan-Tiube and Kuliab. And it occupies the 
Aini air base close to Dushanbe that stations Russian helicopter 
squadrons as well as the Okno spatial surveillance centre near 
the  Chinese  border  (located  at  an  altitude  of  2,200  metres), 
which is home to an electronic and optic monitoring station of 
the Russian spatial forces. Russia does not have any military 
facilities in either Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan, but since the latter 
joined the CSTO, it hopes that Tashkent will allow it to access to 
the Ustyurt Plateau for ballistic missile tests.21 
The two other major sectors of Russo–Central Asian military 
collaboration are first, the provision of military equipment, and 
second,  cooperation  between  military-industrial  complexes. 
Since the start of the 2000s, Russia has supplied the Central 
Asian states with large quantities of military equipment, either 
by selling it at preferential prices, notably to Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan (the only two states in the region able to finance 
their armies) or by supplying the material in return for the rental 
of sites (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan). Russia therefore equips the 
Central Asian armies with weapons, munitions and night-vision 
equipment, along with planes, helicopters, anti-missile defence 
apparatus and tanks (including ships for the Kazakhstani Caspian 
Sea Fleet), and also provides after-sales service and repairs. From 
2005 onwards, Moscow’s influence, bolstered by the importance 
of its Soviet legacy, has further been enhanced by the relaunch 
of the Central Asian military-industrial complex. In Kazakhstan, 
for  example,  there  are  five  Russo–Kazakh  joint  ventures  in 
various military sectors (anti-missile defence systems, torpedo 
construction, anti-ship mines and naval material), not to mention 
joint spatial activities, which have broadened in scope since the 
launch of the Baiterek Space Rocket Complex. Kyrgyzstan itself 
also hopes to revitalise its joint ventures – which specialise in 
torpedoes, weapons and radars – with the support of the state-
run Russian company Rosoboronexport. Uzbekistan has tried to 
revive its cooperation with Russia in the aeronautical domain, 
with the signing of agreements between Moscow and the TAPO 
aviation factory, and the creation of the joint venture UzRosAvia 
to produce aircraft; it also hopes to take advantage of Russian 
advances in spatial equipment for the Maidanak observatory. 
The  eternal  question:  Is  Russia  losing  its 
influence in Central Asia?
Any consideration of Russia’s successes in Central Asia proves 
complex. Indeed, despite its return in the 2000s, Moscow has well 
and truly lost its stranglehold over the region. And yet the Kremlin 
itself seems never to have envisaged returning to a Soviet-style 
situation, nor has it tried to reintegrate the Central Asian states 
politically by including them in the Russian Federation. While 
Moscow hopes to remain Central Asia’s leading partner, it no 
longer imagines its presence will be exclusive. The Kremlin has 
hence learned, to its detriment early on, to compromise with 
other international actors, as evidenced by Vladimir Putin’s post-
11 September acceptance of the opening of American bases 
and its cooperation with China in the framework of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation. The Russian elites are clear-sighted 
and  pragmatic:  they  know  that  the  Central  Asian  states  are 
prepared to exploit the international competition factor in their 
own  national  interests  and  that  the  latter  will  not  give  them 
any preferential policies on grounds of sympathy alone. The 
conclusion therefore seems to be that Russia’s return has been 
a partial success insofar as it has again become an important 
partner and a legitimate ally in a no-longer-monopolistic Central 
Asian market. 
Although Russia has succeeded rather well in its return to Central 
Asia, it is also in the process of becoming a power ‘like the others’ 
in the region – its positions are by no means guaranteed and 
they remain subject to global geopolitical hazards. It is true that 
neighbouring regional powers, such as India, Iran and Turkey, 
lack the means to dethrone Russian supremacy; however, this is 
not the case with China, which is going to prove problematic for 
Russia in the long term.22 Thus far, both powers have managed 
to realise their objectives without clashing head-on, but in all 
likelihood this situation will change rather quickly, especially since 
the competition for control over Central Asia’s subsoil resources 
is likely to become more acute. Up to now, the Russo–Chinese 
alliance in Central Asia has been possible because Beijing has 
an interest in keeping Central Asia under Russia’s political and 
security shelter. But if the Chinese authorities were to consider, 
for whatever reason, that they ought to modify their activities 
in Central Asia, and become involved in political, military and 
cultural issues, and not just in economic ones, then Chinese 
interests would come into conflict with Moscow’s. Central Asian–
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competition between Moscow and Washington. For example, the 
reorientation of American foreign policy towards Afghanistan and 
the more-than-uncertain future of Pakistan might re-imbue Russia 
and the US with the will to work together on stabilising Central 
Asia. The Russian presence in Central Asia is also dependent 
on economic stakes. Since 2000, oil- and gas-related income 
has provided Russia with influence it did not previously have, 
but which it could lose were the global financial crisis, combined 
with lower world prices for hydrocarbons, to continue. Russia’s 
capacity to invest in Central Asia might then run into difficulties 
and this would have a direct impact on its political influence. 
Russia’s weight in Central Asia does not depend solely upon 
global geopolitical and financial redistributions – it also relies on 
domestic factors. As part of a broader historical movement, the 
current demographic crisis, the depopulation of Siberia and the 
general ‘re-centring’ of Russia around the European regions of 
the country signal a historic retreat for Moscow that will inevitably 
affect its presence in Central Asia. The Russian state also has 
difficulties in conceiving of the impact that a massive intake of 
Central Asian workers might have on Russia, and moreover of 
how the rise of xenophobia and Islamophobia in Russian society 
might change its relationship with Central Asia.23 The way Russia 
sees it, the region has only three choices: remain in Russia’s 
fold, sink into a state of chronic instability – whether owing to 
Islamism or the criminalisation of the state by mafia networks – 
or fall under Chinese domination.24 
Policy-oriented debates about Russia’s use of soft power in Central 
Asia confirm that the five states are viewed as an intrinsic and 
natural part of the Russian sphere of influence. More specifically, 
political  submission  and  economic  control  are  desired,  but 
not cultural proximity, since this provokes anxiety. In Russian 
public opinion, Central Asia is usually associated with notions 
of Islamism, terrorism and the mafia, while positive references 
emphasising  the  historical  and  cultural  ties  to  Central  Asian 
peoples are extremely rare. This generalised disdain for Central 
Asia provides the negative context in which the intellectual and 
political elites envisage the economic, geopolitical yet also social 
utility of the region. Moscow, for instance, no longer produces 
any real expert knowledge about this region. Despite its old 
Orientalist traditions, knowledge on Central Asia is drying up and 
reflection on the future of Central Asia in Russian think tanks 
is minimal. This situation can partly be explained by Moscow’s 
general view of Central Asia as part of its de jure sphere of 
influence in Eurasia. 
For the moment, therefore, Russia has almost no long-term vision 
of the relations it would like to entertain with its ‘south’, nor any 
strategy to propose that would offer Central Asia any status other 
than that of being Moscow’s geographical and political appendix. 
The Kremlin is still inclined to think of Central Asia as an acquired 
zone of influence, and the Central Asian governments feel this 
is  disrespectful.  Aware  of  Russia’s  incapacity  to  formulate  a 
coherent plan for its partnership with the region, the Central 
Asian  elites  are  somewhat  resentful.  They  denounce  Russia 
for simply riding on the inertia of its historical legacy, incapable 
of innovation. Still, Moscow ought to reflect upon issues such 
as the renewal of the political elite currently taking shape in 
Central Asia. Once the Soviet generations have disappeared, 
what relation will the new ones have to Russia? Is the Kremlin 
sufficiently  prepared  for  the  upcoming  power  transfers,  in 
particular  in  states  like  Uzbekistan,  where  the  question  of 
political alternation is used as justification for authoritarianism? 
Does Moscow have the ability to measure accurately the West’s 
influence on the younger political generations? What role will 
China come to have as a cultural power in Central Asia in future 
years? And should radical Islam start to destabilise Uzbekistan or 
Kyrgyzstan, what measures does the Kremlin have up its sleeve 
other than violence in the name of the anti-terrorist struggle? 
It does not seem as if the Russian elites have a response to 
propose to any of these questions. 
Russia does have arguments working in its favour, of which it 
might not be aware. Indeed, despite the likelihood that the young 
generation of Central Asian politicians (particularly in Kazakhstan 
and in Kyrgyzstan), who were partly educated outside of the CIS, 
will have a more critical view of Russia, this does not necessarily 
entail that Russophobe circles are about to occupy positions 
of power. On the contrary, the pacification of memory relating 
to the Soviet past, the idea that the USSR was instrumental in 
achieving independence, that Russia continues to be the path to 
Europeanness and that there is a specific ‘Soviet’ or ‘Eurasian’ 
civilisation, are pro-Russian arguments that bear much weight 
among  the  Central  Asian  upper  and  middle  classes.  Yet,  to 
date the Kremlin has not developed any coherent or expansive 
cultural diplomacy for the post-Soviet space. Indeed, it has no 
real suggestions to offer about how to sustain the role of the 
Russian language and Russian-speaking culture in Central Asia, 
although this is now starting to become an important question 
in decision-making circles. Russia could conserve its key role in 
Central Asia were it to give itself the means to do so, including 
complying  with  the  Central  Asian  states’  wishes  for  •	
investments  in  economic  sectors  other  than  those  of 
hydrocarbons; 
continuing  to  train  Central  Asian  political  and  military  •	
cadres; 
promoting  the  Russian  language  among  the  local  •	
populations; 
creating  a  more  secure  working  environment  for  the  •	
millions of Central Asian migrants settled in Russia, not 
to mention reviving the intellectual exchanges between 
Russia and Central Asia, which have practically ceased; 
and 
becoming involved in the politics of lobby-formation and  •	
building influence networks among the young generations 
who stand to inherit the reigns of power. 
Recommendations for the EU
Despite recent tense relations and basic disagreements over 
some  issues  such  as  Georgia,  NATO  enlargement  and  the 
Eastern Partnership, the EU and Russia could cooperate with 
one another in many domains in Central Asia. Rather than speak 
in terms of competition for spheres of influence, which may be 
the case between Russia and the US, the EU essentially tends 
to look at matters in terms of synergies with the other actors in 
the Central Asian game. 
Trying to promote common interest on the energy issue
With  the  onset  of  the  economic  crisis,  the  Russian  elite  (in 
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sought  to  extract  Russia  from  its  deadlock  by  promoting 
economic  diversification  and  by  discretely  criticising  the 
decisions previously taken in favour of hydrocarbons and the 
extraction industries. It is in the EU’s interest to steer Russia in 
the direction of diversification and to encourage it to apply this 
principle in Central Asia. The predominance of Gazprom and 
the large Russian companies in raw materials is detrimental to 
Russian influence in the region, especially with respect to its 
Kazakhstani neighbour, which is asking all its partners to assist 
in its economic restructuring. In addition, the EU must maintain 
dialogue  with  Moscow  concerning  the  positive  character  of 
diversifying Central Asian export routes, which, although contrary 
to short-term Russian interests, can only contribute to stabilising 
Central  Asia  and  therefore  to  preserving  Russia’s  long-term 
interests. 
Enhancing EU–Russian interaction on Afghanistan
Russian leaders are extremely divided about the right position to 
take with regard to Afghanistan. Moscow has continually criticised 
NATO’s decision, but at the same time many Russian politicians 
recognise  that  the  coalition’s  failure  to  stabilise  Afghanistan 
would place Russia in great danger. The EU has every interest in 
promoting cooperation with Moscow on the Afghan issue, since 
their security interests overlap. Despite the legacy of the Soviet 
invasion, Russia, paradoxically, enjoys a relatively positive image 
among the Afghan elites.25 Moscow’s symbolic re-evaluation in 
Western  negotiations  with  the  Afghan  government  would  be 
appreciated by Kabul as it would by Moscow. It would also work 
to disarm discourses critical of American interventionism and 
unwillingness to engage in dialogue with neighbouring regional 
powers. In addition, Russia still has many specific networks of 
influence in Afghanistan among the Tajik and Uzbek minorities 
as well as the former communist movements, a point of leverage 
that could be used when the time comes to seat all the actors 
of  the  Afghan  game  around  the  negotiating  table.  Concrete 
measures  of  cooperation  can  also  be  considered:  common 
reconstruction  of  electricity  cables,  of  hydroelectric  stations, 
the restoration of roads and factories, the construction of wheat 
depots, the reopening of schools, etc. Potentially, Russia can still 
benefit from the major role that it played in the modernisation of 
Afghanistan from the 1950s to 1970s, prior to the invasion, and 
might be better associated with the development projects that 
the international community wants to set up in Afghanistan.
Promoting cooperation on the formation of elites and the reform 
of higher education
Russia  remains  the  first-choice  destination  for  Central  Asian 
students, and since Moscow has become aware of its cultural 
potential,  it  has  tried  to  set  up  branches  of  its  universities 
in Central Asian states. As the EU has set itself the goal of 
promoting higher education in the region, three-way partnerships 
between the EU, Russia and Central Asia might be envisaged. 
Thus, Central Asians studying in Russia might be encouraged 
to take advantage of the exchange programmes with Western 
countries that are taking place in the major Russian universities. 
This kind of project would be particularly well received in Central 
Asia, where Russia continues to be thought of as a cultural 
power at the interface with Europe. 
Promoting cooperation on the management of migration flows
The migration flows from Central Asia to Russia are growing 
ever larger (at least 3 million persons), but the state organs are 
ill adapted to managing the social difficulties associated with 
this phenomenon. This does a disservice to the Central Asian 
migrants, who are marginalised from Russian public life and 
subject to growing xenophobia. The EU states have had lengthy 
experience in such matters, not only in framing public policies, but 
also in dialoguing with the states from which migrants originate 
in the Middle East and in Africa. In addition, Russia’s role as a 
transit country for migrants from Central Asia for whom the EU is 
the final destination is bound to grow. The EU is therefore directly 
concerned by Russia’s ability to manage its migration flows. 
Tripartite mechanisms (EU–Russia–Central Asia), accompanied 
by commissions entrusted with formulating long-term strategies, 
might be implemented in domains such as the legalisation of 
illegal migrants, the fight against work exploitation, the guarantee 
of social rights for migrants, assistance with cultural integration 
(education for children, Russian language courses for adults, 
etc.) and negotiations with countries of origin about the regulation 
of migrants and remittances. 
Promoting cooperation on securitising the borders
Russia is directly threatened by the porosity of its borders with 
Central  Asia  and  Russian  society  is  increasingly  sensitive  to 
the social risks inherent in drug trafficking. In this, Moscow and 
Brussels share the same concerns: both would like to see the 
Central Asian states avoid plunging into an Afghan scenario. As 
such, Russia could be invited to participate in some of the Border 
Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA) initiatives to 
establish regional border assistance centres in Central Asia.
Promoting  cooperation  on  human  security  and  development 
issues
Russia is also worried about the risks of long-term destabilisation 
in Central Asian societies. While Moscow supports the established 
regimes as a rampart against destabilisation, the EU tends to 
think  that  the  refusal  of  electoral  alternation  creates  political 
risks.  Moscow  and  Brussels  could  nonetheless  collaborate 
on more specific projects by trying to remedy the dearth of 
future prospects for development in Central Asia, in particular 
concerning the water–hydro–energy–food crisis. Such projects 
could include financing small capacity hydro-electric stations, 
restoring roads to open up isolated regions, and preparing for 
natural disasters and the possible arrival of ecological refugees 
(from Karakalpakstan, for example), as well as programmes for 
managing potable water, etc. 
Other  timely  measures  could  be  added  to  these  principled 
ones, for instance in relation to mitigating the world economic 
crisis. Russia and the EU have every interest in making sure 
that the states of Central Asia are not too drastically affected 
by it. Measures in this regard might include the coordination 
of bank support programmes for the weakest states, thereby 
guaranteeing  the  payment  of  salaries  and  pensions,  the 
coordination of deliveries of humanitarian aid (notably food aid, 
especially cereals) and medication, etc.
Conclusions
Moscow continues broadly to influence the authoritarian political 
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towards  specialising  in  the  exportation  of  primary  resources, 
which  in  the  long  term  will  prove  a  detrimental  strategy.  In 
this region of the post-Soviet space, Moscow has proven its 
capacity  to  desist  from  issuing  military  threats  and  applying 
direct political pressure, and instead uses more complex tactics. 
In this way, it has been able to turn the continuity of processes 
of Soviet integration to its advantage, as much at the level of 
economic  infrastructure  and  institutional  mechanisms  as  at 
that of the long-standing human relations between Russia and 
Central Asia. Even so, the Russian ability to seduce the Central 
Asian states is limited: the recognition of South Ossetia’s and 
Abkhazia’s independence, tensions with Byelorussia within the 
CSTO,  Uzbekistan’s  increased  autonomy  and  the  underlying 
conflicts between Moscow and Tashkent are confirmation that 
Russian control over the zone has far from stabilised. If Russian 
discourses  are  often  marked  by  references  to  the  imperial 
legacy, in practice Russia’s behaviour in Central Asia is based 
on a much more pragmatic approach relating to its immediate 
economic and security interests. Its ability to co-opt rather than 
coerce elites, its political legitimacy and its cultural values are 
significant factors that work in favour of its continued dominance 
in Central Asia. Nevertheless, despite its large presence in the 
domains of strategy and the military, Russia is without a miracle 
solution for the potential risks of destabilisation facing Central 
Asia, whether such risks are related to Afghanistan (Islamism and 
drug trafficking) or to internal issues in Central Asian societies, 
which have to do with their widespread pauperisation. 
After having practically vanished from Central Asia’s line of sight 
at the beginning of the 1990s, Moscow has returned to the region 
as a legitimate strategic and political ally, even if the future of 
Russia’s presence in Central Asia remains uncertain. For the 
present, the Kremlin is resting on the laurels of its Soviet legacy, 
content  to  exercise  its  influence  on  the  political,  economic, 
cultural and individual levels, but seemingly unaware of the need 
to renew its strategies of influence so that it can shore up its place 
as Central Asia’s premier partner in the coming decades. Russia 
therefore risks being forced, in the more or less near future, 
to seek out partners in the region, all the more so as China’s 
growing presence in Central Asia will result in further problems 
for Moscow. On paper, the possibilities for cooperation between 
Russia and the EU in this region are multiple. But they require 
that the Kremlin begin to open itself to cooperation without seeing 
this step as undermining its would-be right to oversee Central 
Asia. The evolution of EU–Russian cooperation in Central Asia is 
therefore less linked to EU–Central Asian relations than it is to 
EU–Russian relations: the ambiguous combination of partnership 
and competition, even expansionist endeavours, constitutes the 
first obstacle to the development of this cooperation. 
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